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Abstract
The conceptual metaphor theory postulates that inter-
preting metaphorical expressions requires mentally 
simulating the base sensory-motor experiences of the 
conceptual metaphor from which they derived. Even 
though Time Is Space is one of the most studied con-
ceptual metaphors, the evidence about its embodied 
basis is scarce and equivocal. An experiment was 
carried out to test the hypothesis that interpreting Ego 
Moving metaphorical expressions involves simulating 
the experience of moving forward towards a fixed des-
tination. While participants in the experimental group 
read Ego Moving metaphorical expressions after per-
forming the sensory-motor activity that corresponded 
to the base domain, participants in the control group 
read those metaphorical expressions after performing 
an unrelated physical activity. No differences in reading 
times were found between the two conditions. Impli-
cations of these results are discussed in the context 
of previous research on the embodied perspective on 
metaphor comprehension. 
Keywords: Conceptual metaphor, time, space, embodied 
cognition.
Resumen
La teoría de la metáfora conceptual postula que la inter-
pretación de expresiones metafóricas implica simular 
mentalmente las experiencias sensoriomotoras base de 
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las metáforas conceptuales de las que derivan. A pesar 
de que El tiempo es espacio es una de las metáforas 
conceptuales más estudiadas, la evidencia acerca de su 
carácter corporeizado es escasa y difícil de interpretar. 
Se llevó a cabo un experimento para poner a prueba la 
hipótesis de que interpretar expresiones metafóricas 
derivadas de la metáfora conceptual Persona en mo-
vimiento involucra simular la experiencia de avanzar 
hacia un objetivo fijo. Mientras que los participantes 
pertenecientes al grupo experimental leyeron este tipo 
de expresiones metafóricas después de realizar una acti-
vidad sensoriomotora correspondiente al dominio base, 
los participantes del grupo control leyeron las mismas 
expresiones después de realizar una actividad física 
no relacionada. No se encontraron diferencias en los 
tiempos de lectura de ambas condiciones. Se discuten 
las implicaciones de estos resultados en el contexto de 
las investigaciones previas sobre la perspectiva corpo-
reizada acerca de la comprensión de metáforas.
Palabras clave: metáfora conceptual, tiempo, espacio, 
cognición corporeizada.
Resumo
A teoria da metáfora conceitual postula que a inter-
pretação de expressões metafóricas leva a simular 
mentalmente as experiências sensório-motoras base 
das metáforas conceituais das que se derivam. Apesar 
de o tempo é espaço é uma das metáforas conceituais 
mais estudadas, a evidência acerca de seu carácter cor-
porizado é escassa e difícil de interpretar. Levou-se a 
cabo um experimento para pôr a prova a hipótese que 
interpretar expressões metafóricas derivadas da metá-
fora conceitual pessoa em movimento envolve simular 
a experiência de avançar para um objeto fixo. Enquanto 
os participantes pertencentes ao grupo experimental 
leram este tipo de expressões metafóricas depois de 
realizar uma atividade sensório-motora correspondente 
ao domínio base desta metáfora conceitual, os partici-
pantes do grupo controle, leram as mesmas expressões 
metafóricas depois de realizar uma atividade física 
não relacionada. Não se encontraram diferenças nos 
tempos de leitura de ambas as condições. Discutem-se 
as implicações destes resultados no contexto das pes-
quisas prévias sobre a perspectiva corporizada acerca 
da compreensão de metáforas. 
Palavras-chave: metáfora conceitual, tempo, espaço, 
cognição corporizada.
 “We are approaching Friday” and “Christmas 
will soon be upon us” are metaphorical expressions 
(mes) in which words about spatial movement are 
employed to talk about the passage of time. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) identified a large number of 
systems of mes in which abstract concepts (e.g., 
time) are regularly understood in terms of more 
concrete ones (e.g., spatial movement) by means 
of culturally shared analogies or conceptual meta-
phors (e.g., the Time Is Space conceptual metaphor). 
Time Is Space is one of the most studied con-
ceptual metaphors, and it has many variations 
across languages and cultures (Casasanto, 2009). 
In the Ego Moving version (Boroditsky, 2000), 
the person moves ahead along a straight line in 
which successive points represent moments in the 
future. The amount of time that will need to elapse 
for the future moment to occur is represented as 
the distance the person has to advance in order to 
reach its corresponding point in the line. As the 
person advances, the locations that are left behind 
him or her represent past moments. In contrast, in 
the Time Moving version, the person is represented 
as remaining in a fixed location, with moments in 
time (portrayed as objects) passing by him/her. 
In this case, the amount of time necessary for the 
future moment to take place is represented as the 
distance the moving moment has to cover to reach 
the person. Again, while objects approaching the 
observer represent future moments, objects leav-
ing the observer behind represent moments that 
have already occurred. There is plenty of evidence 
that the Ego Moving and the Time Moving ver-
sions are profusely used in languages like English 
(Alloway, Corley, & Ramscar, 2006; Boroditsky 
& Ramscar, 2002; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 
2002; Teuscher, McQuire, Collins, & Coulson, 
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2008), Spanish (Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiáñez, 
2006), German (Ulrich, Eikmeier, De la Vega, 
Ruiz-Fernández, Alex-Ruf, & Maienborn, 2012), 
Swedish (Rothe-Wulf, Beller, & Bender, 2014), and 
Mandarin Chinese (Bender, Beller, & Bennardo, 
2010). Other variations of Time Is Space depend 
on conventional factors such as the direction of 
writing, with English speakers representing the 
future on the right side (Ouellet, Santiago, Israeli, 
& Gabay, 2010), Hebrew and Arabic speakers rep-
resenting it on the left (Fuhrman, & Boroditsky, 
2010) and Mandarin Chinese speakers represent-
ing it on the bottom (e.g., Fuhrman, McCormick, 
Chen, Jiang, Shu, Mao, & Boroditsky, 2011).1 The 
different variations of the Time Is Space conceptual 
metaphor have manifestations in several motor and 
cognitive processes, ranging from the interpretation 
of metaphorical language (e.g, Boroditsky, 2000) 
to co-speech gestures (e.g., Casasanto & Jasmin, 
2012), postural sway (e.g., Miles, Nind, & Mac-
rae, 2010), duration estimations (e.g., Casasanto, 
& Boroditsky, 2008), categorical judgments (e.g., 
Santiago, Lupiáñez, Pérez, & Funes, 2007), and 
spatial attention (e.g., Ouellet, Santiago, Funez, 
& Lupiáñez, 2010).
Many psycholinguistic studies have provided 
experimental evidence for conceptual metaphor 
theorists’ claim that understanding mes involves 
the activation of conceptual metaphors (e.g., 
Albritton, McKoon, & Gerrig, 1995; Gentner & 
Boronat, 1991; Gibbs, Bogdanovich, Sykes, & 
Barr, 1997; Langston, 2002; Thibodeau, & Durgin, 
2008; see Gibbs, 2006a for further evidence). In 
particular, there is plenty of evidence that the Ego 
Moving and the Time Moving conceptual meta-
phors are used to interpret mes derived from them 
(e.g., Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Gentner, Imai, & 
Boroditsky, 2002; McGlone, & Harding, 1998; 
Núñez, Motz, & Teuscher, 2006). For instance, 
1 See Bender and Beller (2014) for a systematic review of 
different versions of the Time Is Space conceptual metaphor 
across cultures.
McGlone and Harding (1998, Experiment 2) pre-
sented participants with blocks of mes in which 
the expression “The meeting originally scheduled 
for next Wednesday has been moved forward two 
days” was preceded either by three Time Moving 
or Ego Moving sentences. Whereas, according to 
the Ego Moving perspective, the target expression 
would be interpreted as implying that the meeting 
would take place on Friday, lining up to the Time 
Moving one it would be understood as implying 
that the meeting would take place on Monday. 
Results showed that participants tended to disam-
biguate the target sentence in a manner consistent 
with the prior ones.
The conceptual metaphor theory postulates that 
abstract concepts —whose meaning does not di-
rectly refer to sensory-motor experiences— borrow 
their semantic contents from more concrete base 
concepts that emerge directly from our physical 
and cultural experiences with the environment. 
Conceptual metaphors’ cognitive function would 
then consist in providing abstract concepts with 
sensory-motor grounding (Gibbs, 2006b; Lakoff, 
2008). This way, the interpretation of mes implies 
the projection of image schemas (Johnson, 1987; 
for an extended discussion on it, see Hampe, & 
Grady, 2005) of the conceptual metaphor from 
which such me derived. Image schemas designate 
generic structures that capture the shared features 
among a variety of sensory-motor experiences that 
we repeatedly perform in our exchanges with the 
physical and social environment, which are encoded 
in an analogical format of a perceptive and motor 
type. For instance, the Source-Path-Goal image 
schema —which constitutes the base domain of 
the Ego Moving metaphor— arises from the daily 
and recurrent childhood experiences of moving 
our bodies through space in search of a physical 
object. Within the neural proposal of conceptual 
metaphor theory, the construct of image schema 
has been more recently redefined in terms of sen-
sory-motor simulations of the base domains (Feld-
man, 2006; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). Under this 
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reformulation, the comprehension of mes would 
involve simulating the sensory-motor actions up-
on which a conceptual metaphor is grounded, by 
emphatically replicating the experiential state of 
the speaker who conveyed the mes (Gibbs, 2006b). 
Although several studies have dealt with the 
embodied nature of other conceptual metaphors 
(e.g., Gibbs, 2013, Experiment 1b; Santana & de 
Vega, 2011, Experiment 2; and Wilson & Gibbs, 
2007, Experiment 1), the study carried out by 
Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002; Experiments 2 
and 4) represents the only available investigation 
on the activation of spatial sensory-motor patterns 
during the interpretation of mes in which time is 
understood in terms of space. These authors sought 
to determine whether the interpretation of such ex-
pressions can be biased by previously performing 
vs. thinking about a particular sensory-motor activ-
ity. In Experiment 2, they presented McGlone and 
Harding’s (1998) ambiguous question (i.e., “The 
meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday 
has been moved forward two days. What day is 
the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?”) to 
actual passengers in a moving train. The authors 
conjectured that participants who had just boarded 
the train or were about to get off probably had been 
thinking about their movement more intensely 
than those who were in the middle of the trip. 
Hence, these participants would be relatively more 
prone to disambiguating the target expression in a 
manner consistent with the Ego Moving perspec-
tive. Upon confirming this prediction, the authors 
interpreted that thinking about movement, rather 
than movement itself, was what determined partic-
ipants’ interpretations. In Experiment 4, the same 
ambiguous question was asked to participants who 
were waiting in a lunch line. In order to separate 
the influence of thinking about motion from that 
of actual movement on participants’ responses, 
the experimenters asked them how long they felt 
they had waited in line (an indicator of thinking 
about their motion), while also recording in which 
line quartile they were located at the moment they 
were interviewed (physical movement). In contrast 
with the results from the train experiment, the 
lunch line experiment showed that it was actual 
movement, rather than participants thought about 
it, what determined their responses.2
Several common limitations of these two ex-
periments make it difficult to extract conclusions 
from them, and even more to explain their incon-
sistent results. In the first place, the very task of 
disambiguating Wednesday’s meeting question 
does not seem appropriate for studying the Ego 
Moving conceptual metaphor. As posited by Nuñez 
and Sweetser (2006), the ambiguous expression 
may correspond to the Time-Reference-Point con-
ceptual metaphor, in terms of which earlier times 
are placed in front of later times in a mental time-
line, without making reference to an ego. Sec-
ondly, a comparison between the relative effects 
of actually performing some actions and simply 
thinking about them does not seem appropriate to 
assess the effect of sensory-motor priming on the 
comprehension of mes, since there is evidence that 
real actions and merely thinking about them can 
give rise to similar sensory-motor activations, thus 
yielding comparable priming effects in metaphor 
comprehension (e.g., Wilson & Gibbs, 2007).
In the present study, we set forth to assess 
whether the interpretation of Ego Moving mes in-
volves simulating the sensory-motor actions 
corresponding to the base domain of the concep-
tual metaphor. To this end, we resorted to a more 
2 Besides these experiments, Borodisky and Ramscar 
(2002) performed another one in which they presented 
participants in an airport the ambiguous question. While 
some of them were waiting for other people to arrive, 
others were waiting to fly, and others had just arrived. 
Results showed that people who had just flown in were 
more likely to answer, according to the Ego Moving 
perspective than people who were waiting to depart, and 
that in turn, the latter gave the Ego Moving answer more 
frequently than people who were waiting for other people 
to arrive. Given that there is no comparison between 
participants performing a sensory-motor activity vs. 
participants thinking about such movement, we did not 
take into account this experiment.
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traditional procedure that consists in having two 
groups of participants read mes corresponding 
to the Ego Moving perspective and recording the 
time taken to comprehend them.3 While one of 
the groups read the mes after having performed 
a physical activity that was consistent with the 
Ego Moving perspective (walking), the other 
group received such expressions after having 
performed a physical activity that was unrelated 
to the Ego Moving respective (sitting down and 
standing up). Participants in the walking condition 
moved forward towards successive computers 
arranged in a line (see figure 1), at which they 
stopped to complete their tasks. At Computer 1, 
they just waited for a moment, and then walked 
to Computer 2, where they read a group of mes. 
Afterward, they walked to Computer 3, on which 
they read another group of mes, and then walked 
back to Computer 1. They repeated this circuit 
several times. In contrast, participants in the sitting 
down condition completed their tasks standing 
in front of a single computer, sitting down and 
standing up again before reading each group of 
mes. Our objective was to establish whether the 
interpretation of mes was facilitated (as observed 
in reading times) after performing the consistent 
physical action, in comparison to the neutral con-
dition. Before presenting the experiment proper, 
we describe a pilot study aimed at selecting an 
appropriate set of mes.
3  We decided to use Ego Moving mes and not Time Moving 
mes because while the Time Moving perspective is associated 
with a simple perceptive and passive activity, the Ego Moving 
perspective is associated with a more complex and active 
sensory-motor activity.
Figure 1. A circuit as completed by participants in the 
walking condition. In each circuit, they walked forward 
stopping to wait (at Computer 1) or to interpret MEs 
and then press a button as soon as they had understood 
them (at Computers 2 and 3).
Pilot Study
Given that engaging in a walking activity could 
lead participants to activate words related to such ac-
tivity (e.g., approach), such lexical activation could, 
in turn, facilitate the processing of mes including 
those words (e.g., “We were approaching the new 
millennium”). We carried out a pilot study to ensure 
that the words to be included in the critical mes of 
the experiment are not automatically activated by 
the action of walking. To this end, the sensory-motor 
words that comprised the mes that were candidates 
for being employed in the main study were includ-
ed in a lexical decision task that participants had to 
carry out immediately after having either walked 
(consistent motor activity) or stood up and sat down 
(inconsistent motor activity). The control study 
was intended to rule out a possible confounding 
between sensory-motor and lexical facilitations.4
4 Similar studies aimed at determining whether the interpreta-
tion of mes entails performing sensory-motor simulations did 
not control for the possibility of confounding between senso-
ry-motor and lexical facilitation, or they did it in inadequate 
ways. For instance, Wilson and Gibbs (2007, Experiment 
1) had participants learn to perform different actions they 
watched on a computer screen. After performing the action, 
they had learned, they read a me and pressed a key once they 
had comprehended it. Whereas in half of the cases the me was 
preceded by an action that, according to the sensory-motor 
hypothesis, would be required for its comprehension (e.g., 
reading Grasp a concept after grasping), in the other half 
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and not its auxiliaries. On the other hand, neither 
prepositions nor adverbs were selected. Appendix 
A shows the initial set of 15 mes, as well as the sen-
sory-motor words selected for this pilot study. All 
selected verbs appeared in infinitive tense during 
the lexical decision task. The total number of critical 
sensory-motor words was 24. Forty-six non-critical 
words were included to prevent participants from 
realizing that words referred to sensory-motor ac-
tivities (see Appendix B). Seventy non-words were 
also included to equate the probabilities of positive 
and negative responses. 
Twenty-four blocks of items were presented in 
both conditions, each one comprising a critical word, 
a non-critical word, and two non-words. While in half 
of the blocks, the critical sensory-motor word was 
shown first, in the other half, it was shown second. 
This was done to ensure that they were processed 
right after they had carried out the sensory-motor 
activity. Moreover, as a further measure to prevent 
participants from predicting the correct responses 
(i.e., that if the first item was a word, the second one 
should be a non-word), 20 item blocks were added 
in which all items were non-critical words and non-
words. All filler blocks included two words and two 
non-words whose order was randomized. There 
were five types of filler blocks: all words; all non-
words; one word and three non-words; one non-word 
and three words, and two words and non-words.
The text font was 24-point bold Arial, white on 
a dark grey background. Each item was preceded 
by a 17 ms “++” sign appearing in the middle of the 
screen and serving as a fixation point, followed by 
a 17 ms blank screen. The timeout was 2500 ms, and 
feedback was given on each response. The order 
of presentation of the blocks containing critical 
items was counterbalanced across participants and 
across item blocks.
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in a quiet room 
of 6 m in width and 30 m in length, computers were 
Participants
Sixty undergraduate students from the Univer-
sity of Comahue (25 male and 35 female, M = 22.1 
years, SD = 2.45 years) gave informed consent to 
take part in the study, conducted in accordance 
with Helsinki’s revised declaration. They were 
native speakers of Spanish and had either normal 
or corrected to normal sight. They were randomly 
assigned to the congruent and incongruent motor 
priming condition.
Materials
We selected all the words referred to sensory-mo-
tor activities from an initial pool of mes. For exam-
ple, “ponían” (set) and “pies” (feet) were extracted 
from “Ya casi ponían sus pies en Diciembre” (They 
were about to set their feet on December). In the 
case of compound verbs, we selected the main verb 
of the cases such me was preceded by an unrelated action 
(e.g., reading Grasp a concept after blinking an eye). As 
reading times were shorter in the consistent condition, the 
comprehension of mes was thought to entail the activation 
of the grasping sensory-motor schema. However, it is pos-
sible to explain the results obtained by Wilson and Gibbs 
(2007) in terms of lexical priming. Engaging in an action 
such as grasping could lead participants to activate the word 
“grasp”, which in turn would facilitate the reading of mes 
that include that word (e.g., Grasp the concept). The authors 
performed an independent study to rule out this possibility. 
In order to determine whether the execution of the relevant 
action indeed led to the activation of the words included 
in the mes, they asked an independent group to engage in 
the same actions performed by the subjects in the experi-
mental group and then to verbally describe such actions. 
As the mes that showed the greatest priming effect in the 
main experiment contained words that were different from 
the ones used to describe actions in the control study, the 
authors interpreted that the lexical account could be ruled 
out. Nonetheless, a possible deficit could reside in the fact 
that in order to find out if any lexical priming effect elicited, 
the authors relied on participant reports about the words that 
could best describe the actions performed. It is likely that 
although participants in the control study did not mention 
the same words that were included in the mes, these words 
received an unconscious activation from the sensory-motor 
activity. If this was also the case for participants in the main 
experiment, the activation of such words could have facili-
tated the reading of mes in which such words were included.
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10 m apart from each other. The experiment was run 
on one (sitting down condition) or three (walking 
condition) personal laptop computers. Participants 
were tested individually. In the walking condition, 
three computers were placed along a straight line 
in which participants walked frontward, facing the 
computer screens (see figure 1). They had to stop 
to perform the task at each of the stands supporting 
the computers, maintaining a standing position. In 
contrast, in the sitting down condition, participants 
had to complete their tasks on a single computer 
on a stand, and they had to sit down and then to 
stand up again in between completing their tasks. 
In the walking condition, participants completed 
22 circuits, with each circuit comprising the dis-
placement from Computer 1 to Computer 2, from 
Computer 2 to Computer 3, and from Computer 3 
back to Computer 1. The first circuit was completed 
as follows. Participants started at Computer 1, 
where the following instruction was shown: “When 
pressing X on Computer 2, four items will appear on 
the screen, one at a time. You will have to respond 
as quickly as possible whether the item is a word 
or not. To enter your responses, you will use a joy-
stick with buttons for “yes” and “no”, and you will 
receive feedback on each response. After reading 
four items on Computer 2 and four more items on 
Computer 3, you have to go back to Computer 1. 
To begin, please press X on Computer 2”. When 
participants completed the block shown on Com-
puter 2, the instruction “Press X on Computer 3” 
appeared on the screen. Participants then walked 
to Computer 3 and completed another block of 
items. Once the block shown on Computer 3 was 
completed, participants were required to proceed to 
Computer 1. The remaining 21 circuits were iden-
tical to the first, except for the fact that the general 
instructions presented on Computer 1 were removed. 
The procedure was the same for the sitting down 
condition, except that instead of walking from one 
computer to the next, participants were asked to sit 
down and then stand up in between blocks. Before 
the experiment, participants of both conditions 
completed six practice blocks, following the same 
procedure as in the main one.
Results
Lexical decision times obtained in the control 
study revealed a priming effect for the critical sen-
sory-motor word “acercábamos” (approaching), 
t(43.812) = 3.676, p = .001. Therefore, the me from 
the initial pool that contained this word —”Nos acer-
cábamos a fin de año” (We were approaching the New 
Year)— was not included in the main experiment.
Experiment
Two groups of participants read mes, correspond-
ing to the Ego Moving perspective. As in the pilot 
study, while one of the groups read the mes after 
having performed a physical activity that was con-
sistent with the Ego Moving perspective (walking), 
the other group received such expressions after 
having performed a physical activity that was 
unrelated to the Ego Moving respective (sitting 
down and standing up). The dependent variable 
was the time taken by participants to comprehend 
the expressions.
Participants
Sixty undergraduate psychology students at the 
University of Comahue participated in exchange for 
course credit (22 male and 38 female, M = 22.6 years, 
SD = 2.8 years). All participants were native speak-
ers of Spanish and had either normal or corrected 
to normal sight. Participants gave informed consent 
to take part in the study, which was conducted in 
accordance with the revised declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
As a result of the pilot study, we included 14 mes 
derived from the Ego Moving perspective (e.g., “Ya 
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estaba apoyando mis plantas en el nuevo milenio” 
[I was already setting the soles of my feet on the 
new millennium]) and 28 filler mes derived from 
other conceptual metaphors referred to time (e.g., 
“Invirtió varios años en entrenarse para los exam-
ines finales” [He spent many years training for his 
final exams], from Time Is Money, see complete 
list in Appendix C). Each block of mes comprised 
a critical me (i.e., from the Ego Moving) and two 
filler mes (e.g., one from Time Is Money and the 
other one from Time Is A Substance). The critical 
expression of each triplet was always presented 
first, in order to ensure that it was processed right 
after experimental participants had carried out the 
Ego Moving sensory-motor activity. The inclusion 
of fillers was intended to prevent participants from 
becoming aware of the centrality of Ego Moving 
mes throughout the experiment, as well as to pre-
vent participants from carrying-over activation of 
the Ego Moving conceptual metaphor from one 
computer to the next as an effect of having applied 
it to interpret mes. Each sentence was followed 
by a simple yes/no question (e.g., after the sen-
tence: “We felt that we were stuck in 2012”, the 
question was “did they feel they were not making 
progress?”). While for half of the questions, the 
correct answer was yes, for the other half, it was 
no (see Appendices A and C). These questions 
were included both to enforce participants to read 
the expressions carefully, as well as to eliminate 
participants who did not show evidence of paying 
adequate attention to the experimental materials. 
The order of the blocks was randomized across 
participants. Metaphorical expressions and ques-
tions were displayed in the center of the screen 
and did not exceed a complete line of text. The 
text font was 22-point bold Arial, white on a dark 
grey background. Timeout for each me and for 
its corresponding question was 10 s. Participants 
used a joystick to complete their tasks. There were 
three response buttons: X, to indicate that the me 
was understood, and yes and no, to answer the 
question about the me.
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in a quiet room 
of 6 m in width and 30 m in length, computers were 
10 m apart from each other. The experiment was 
written in DmDX code (Forster & Forster, 2003) 
and run on one (sitting down condition) or three 
(walking condition) personal laptop computers of 
1,024 x 768 pixels.
Participants were tested individually and told that 
they would take part in an experiment on language 
comprehension. The experiment lasted approximate-
ly 20 minutes. In both conditions, participants had to 
read mes and then to press a button as soon as they 
understood their meaning. Right after a response 
was emitted, a question about the me presented 
appeared on screen, together with yes/no options. 
Upon responding at each of these questions, a sign 
stating either “your response is correct” or “your 
response is incorrect” was displayed. As in the pilot 
study, three computers were placed along a straight 
line in which participants in the walking condition 
walked frontward, facing the computer screens. They 
had to stop to perform the task at each of the stands 
supporting the computers, maintaining a standing 
position. In contrast, participants in the sitting down 
condition had to read the mes from a single com-
puter on a stand, and they had to sit down and then 
to stand up again upon completing each block.
In the walking condition, participants completed 
seven circuits, with each circuit comprising the dis-
placement from Computer 1 to Computer 2, from 
Computer 2 to Computer 3, and from Computer 3 
back to Computer 1. The first circuit was complet-
ed as follows. Participants started at Computer 1, 
where the following instruction was shown: “When 
pressing X on Computer 2, three sentences will 
appear on the screen, one at a time. You will have 
to read each of them carefully and press X as soon 
as you comprehend it. After reading each of the 
sentences, a simple yes/no question about that sen-
tence will appear. You will receive feedback about 
the correctness of your answer. After reading three 
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sentences on Computer 2 and three more sentences 
at Computer 3, you have to go back to Computer 
1. To begin, please press X on Computer 2”. When 
participants completed the triplet of mes shown on 
Computer 2, the instruction “Press X on Computer 
3” appeared on the screen. Participants then walked 
to Computer 3 and completed another triplet of mes. 
Once the triplet of mes shown on Computer 3 was 
completed, participants were required to proceed to 
Computer 1. The remaining six circuits were iden-
tical to the first, except for the fact that the general 
instructions presented on Computer 1 were removed. 
The procedure was the same for the sitting down 
condition, except that instead of walking from one 
computer to the next, participants were asked to sit 
down and then stand up in between triplets. Before 
the experiment, participants of both conditions 
completed six practice triplets, following the same 
procedure as in the main experiment. 
Results and Discussion
Given that all participants gave correct answers 
to more than 80% of the comprehension questions, 
no participants were withdrawn from the data 
analysis. For each of the critical and filler expres-
sions, all reading times two standard deviations 
above or below the mean (4.09% of the data set) 
were excluded from the data set and replaced by 
the average of all participants reading such ex-
pression under the same experimental condition. 
A subject analysis of the time taken to understand 
Ego Moving mes revealed no differences in reading 
times between the walking condition (M = 3.448 
s, SD = 0.452) and the sitting down condition 
(M = 3.461 s, SD = 0.723), t(48.665) = -0.082, 
p = .935. An item analysis of the same data set 
also failed to find a difference in comprehension 
times between the walking condition (M = 3.448 
s, SD = 0.714) and the sitting down condition 
(M = 3.461 s, SD = 0.901), t(26) = -0.041, p = .967. 
Thus, results show no evidence that the activity of 
walking affects the comprehension times of Ego 
Moving mes.
A possible concern with respect to the validity 
of the obtained results might be that not all mes 
employed in the experiment correspond, as we 
supposed, to the Ego Moving conceptual metaphor. 
In order to determine this, we presented the mes 
to two independent judges who classified them as 
instances of the Ego Moving conceptual metaphor, 
the Time Moving conceptual metaphor, or none of 
them. Both judges were cognitive psychologists 
at the National University of Comahue and were 
oblivious to the objective of the study. They re-
ceived explanations of each conceptual metaphor 
accompanied by an animation displaying the basic 
events involved in them. In the animation for the 
Ego Moving metaphor, a person walked towards 
a still circle representing an event on a point in the 
timeline, passing it by and leaving it behind. In 
the animation for the Time Moving metaphor, a 
person remained still while the circle moved to-
wards him, passing him by and, as a result, being 
left behind. After the explanation of each concep-
tual metaphor, judges were presented with three 
examples of mes derived from it. Subsequently, 
they were presented with the 14 mes employed 
in the study. They had to mark their choice with 
a cross (Ego Moving, Time Moving, or none of 
them). We considered a me as a case of the Ego 
Moving conceptual metaphor, the Time Moving 
conceptual metaphor, or none of them only when 
they were categorized as such by both judges. They 
agreed on all but four mes (71.43% of the cases). 
Specifically, “Todavía tenía cerca de mi nuca el 
mes de Abril” (April was still close to my neck) 
was categorized as Time Moving and as “none of 
them”, “Ya no podíamos retornar a los tiempos 
pasados” (We were unable to return to past times) 
was considered as Ego Moving and “none of them”, 
“Había dejado a mis espaldas buena parte del si-
glo” [I had already left a good part of this century 
behind my back] was regarded as Time Moving and 
as Ego Moving, and “Sentíamos que estábamos 
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varados en el 2012” (We felt that we were stuck 
in 2012) was considered as Ego Moving and “none 
of them”. On the other hand, judges agreed on 
considering “Detenidos en la juventud, la vejez 
nos parecía muy distante” (Stopped at youth, se-
nescence felt very distant), as “none of them”. An 
analysis was performed, excluding the mentioned 
mes. The reading times of mes in the consistent 
condition (M = 3397.81ms, SD = 461.61ms) did 
not differ from those of the inconsistent condition 
(M = 3299.08ms, SD = 684.67ms), t(50.85) = 0.655, 
p = .516, showing that there was no incidence of 
the activity of walking on the reading time of Ego 
Moving mes. In this way, even when the analysis 
was circumscribed to mes, independently con-
trolled to pertain to the Ego Emoving conceptual 
metaphor, results were the same as when all mes 
were included.
General Discussion
As Casasanto (2009) pointed out, the Time Is 
Space conceptual metaphor constitutes a sort of “fruit 
fly” for metaphor theorists, as it is the most explored 
conceptual metaphor in the field. According to con-
ceptual metaphor theory, comprehending mes in 
which time is understood in terms of space implies 
simulating the sensory-motor involved in the spatial 
movement. In the Ego Moving version of this con-
ceptual metaphor, it implies simulating the action of 
moving forward towards an object that corresponds 
to a future moment in time (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999). There is extensive evidence for the thesis that 
both the Ego Moving and Time Moving variants are 
used in the interpretation of MEs (e.g., Boroditsky, 
2000; 2001; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002; 
McGlone & Harding, 1998). However, Boroditsky, 
and Ramscar (2002) is the only study that has inves-
tigated their representational modality. 
The present experiment was aimed at assessing 
whether the Ego Moving conceptual metaphor is 
bodily grounded,  by a procedure that circumvents 
the described shortcomings of the one followed by 
Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002). While participants 
in the experimental group read Ego Moving mes after 
performing the sensory-motor activity referred to 
by the base domain (i.e., walking forward), those in 
the control group read such expressions after hav-
ing performed an irrelevant physical activity (i.e., 
sitting down and standing up). No differences in 
reading times were found between both conditions.
The embodied hypothesis posits that the interpre-
tation of mes involves a sensory-motor simulation 
of the base domain of a conceptual metaphor. We 
reasoned that if a mental simulation of a base domain 
can on occasions facilitate the comprehension of 
mes (Wilson & Gibbs, 2007), the physical realiza-
tion of the base sensory-motor activity should yield 
even stronger facilitation. An alternative to the em-
bodied hypothesis would posit that comprehending 
mes does not require sensory-motor simulations of 
the base domain, but rather computing an analogy 
in an amodal, or abstract format. Given that our 
manipulation did not affect comprehension times, 
the most plausible conclusion is that participants 
made sense of mes by means of an amodal repre-
sentation of the conceptual metaphor. Our results 
are consistent with Cacciari and Pesciarelli’s (2013) 
findings that mes, including verbs that refer to the 
spatial movement (e.g., “The student jumps from a 
book to another one”), do not engage sensory-motor 
simulations. They are also compatible with exper-
iments involving patients with lesions in the left 
perisylvian cortex (Kemmerer, 2005). In his study, 
participants with impaired knowledge of the spatial 
meanings of prepositions (e.g., at the corner) did 
not show any deficits in understanding the temporal 
meanings of the same prepositions (e.g., at 1:30), 
which led the author to conclude, contrary to the 
embodiment hypothesis, that the comprehension 
of mes referring to time does not require spatial 
representations. In turn, the neurological evidence 
reviewed by Kranjec and Chatterjee (2010) indi-
cated that spatial representations are stored either 
as amodal, left-hemisphere representations closely 
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linked to language or as embodied, right-hemisphere 
representations more closely related to perception. 
Regarding this distinction, the results of the present 
study suggest that the reading of mes derived from 
the Ego Moving perspective engages the former kind 
of representations, rather than the latter. Simi-
lar conclusions have been derived regarding other 
conceptual metaphors. For example, Minervino, 
Martín, Tavernini, and Trench (2018) obtained evi-
dence that the comprehension of mes derived from 
the Understanding Is Seeing conceptual metaphor 
does not necessitate carrying out sensory-motor 
simulations of the experience of seeing. In that 
experiment, congenitally blind individuals’ com-
prehension of such expressions was equal to that of 
sighted participants, suggesting that their interpre-
tation did not involve sensory motor simulations 
of the base domain of seeing. However, the results 
of neuroscientific studies lead to mixed conclu-
sions. Some fmri studies have found that portions 
of the somatosensory cortex were activated during 
the comprehension of mes (e.g., Boulenger, Hauk, 
& Pulvermüller, 2009; Chen, Widick, & Chatterjee, 
2008; Lacey, Stilla, & Sathian, 2012). For instance, 
Lacey et al. (2012) found that while the parietal 
operculum, a region of the brain for sensing texture 
through touch, was activated when participants lis-
tened to textural mes (e.g., A rough day), the same 
region was not activated when listening to literal 
expressions of equivalent meaning (e.g., A difficult 
day). Desai, Binder, Conant, Mano, and Seidenberg 
(2011) found that while both literal and mes refer-
ring to different kinds of sensory-motor activities 
activated the left anterior parietal lobule, an area 
involved in action planning, activation in primary 
motor and biological motion perception regions was 
inversely correlated with sentence conventionality. 
In contrast, other fmri studies have found that brain 
areas involved in somatosensory processing were 
activated for literal expressions, but not metaphorical 
ones (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iaco-
boni, 2006; Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 
2008). As an example, Raposo et al. (2008) found 
activation of motor and premotor areas only when 
participants listened to leg and arm related literal 
sentences (e.g., “The muddy children trampled 
over Sarah’s clean floor” and “The fruit cake was 
the last one so Claire grabbed it”, respectively), but 
not when presented with mes including the same 
leg and arm related verbs (e.g., “The spiteful critic 
trampled over Sarah’s feelings” and “The job offer 
was a great chance so Claire grabbed it”, respec-
tively), which in turn engaged front-temporal areas 
associated with language processing.
It does not seem easy to put forward a plausible 
explanation for the inconsistent results obtained in 
psychological and neuroscientific studies. It might 
be useful to discuss the possibility that conceptual 
metaphors require sensory-motor simulations that 
vary as a function of the tasks being performed and 
the specific conceptual metaphors at stake. This 
would imply adopting a more pluralist perspec-
tive with respect to the representational format 
of concepts, as advocated by authors like Dove 
(2010) and Zwaan (2014). In any case, the study of 
the sensory-motor basis of conceptual metaphors 
requires a multidisciplinary approach, as well as 
taking into account studies that show positive re-
sults as well as those presenting negative results.
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Appendix A
EGO MOVING metaphorical expressions employed 
in the main experiment
1. Apenas habíamos despegado los talones y ya 
era el nuevo siglo [We had just detached our 
heels from the ground and it was already the 
new century].
 ¿Sentimos que transcurrió rápido el tiempo? 
[Did we feel that time had elapsed quickly] 
2. Ya estaba apoyando mis plantas en el nuevo mile-
nio [I was already setting the soles of my feet 
on the new millennium].
 ¿Estabamos en el mismo milenio? [Were we 
still in the same millennium?] 
3. Todavía tenía cerca de mi nuca el mes de Abril 
[April was still close to my neck].
 ¿Sentía que el mes de abril realmente pertenecía 
al pasado? [Did she really feel that April be-
longed to the past]
4. Ya casi ponían sus pies en Diciembre [They were 
almost putting their feet on December].
 ¿Estábamos a fin de año? [Were we at the end 
of the year?] 
5. Sentíamos que estábamos varados en el 2012 [We 
felt that we were stuck in 2012].
 ¿Nos era fácil superar 2012? [Was it easy for 
us to get over 2012?]
6. Habíamos dado una zancada nada más y ya era vi-
ernes [We had strided and it was already Friday].
 ¿Nos sorprendía que fuera viernes? [Were we 
surprised that we were already on Friday?] 
7. Apenas me había puesto en marcha y ya estaba 
viviendo mi adolescencia [I was just getting 
going and I was already living my adolescence].
 ¿Tuve la sensación de que duró mucho la infan-
cia? [Did I have the feeling that my childhood 
had lasted too long?] 
8. Había dejado a mis espaldas buena parte del siglo 
[I had already left a good part of this century 
behind my back].
 ¿Había transcurrido mucho del siglo? [Had a 
significant proportion of the century elapsed?] 
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9. Detenidos en la juventud, la vejez nos parecía 
muy distante [Stopped at youth, senescence 
felt very distant].
 ¿Sentíamos que transcurría la juventud? [Did 
we feel that youth was vanishing too quickly]
10. Nos habíamos alejado ya de la primera década. 
[We were already far away from the first decade]. 
 ¿Había transcurrido bastante desde la prime-
ra década? [had a significant amount of time 
elapsed after our first decade?] 
11. Nos desplazábamos hacia la Navidad [We were 
moving towards Christmas]. 
 ¿Había ocurrido la Navidad? [Had Christmas 
taken place?]
12. Ya no podíamos retornar a los tiempos pasados 
[We were not able to return to past times].
 ¿Querían revivir cosas? [Did they want to re-
vive stuff?] 
13. Transitamos rápido el 2012 [We travelled quickly 
through the year 2012].
 ¿Se hacía interminable el 2012? [Did it feel as 
of 2012 was never ending?]
14. Atravesamos el invierno muy lentamente [We 
went through the winter very slowly].
 ¿Parecía que duraba mucho el invierno? [Did 
the winter appear to last long?] 
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Appendix C
Filler metaphorical expressions, main experiment
1. Invirtió varios años en entrenarse para los exa-
mines finales [He spent many years training for 
his final exams].
¿Fue a los examenes sin estudiar? [Did he sit for 
the exam without having studied?]
2. Había que salir como fuera de ese año nefasto 
[It was imperative to exit that year by whatever 
means]
¿Fue malo aquel año? [was that a bad year?] 
3. Se metían dentro de una década en la que queda-
rían atrapados [they were getting into a decade 
in which they were to get trapped]
¿Sería una decáda de poca importancia? [would 
that be a decade without importance?]
4. Llenábamos el tiempo con las actividades más 
tontas [we were filling time with the silliest ac-
tivities]
¿Estaban faltos de tareas importantes? [were 
they lacking important activities?] 
5. Se reservó los últimos minutos para pensar en 
ella [He saved the last minutes to think of her]
¿Dedicó los últimos minutos a cosas espirituales? 
[Did he save his last minutes to spiritual matters?] 
6. Al fin pude recuperar el tiempo perdido de mi 
juventud [At last I could make up the misspent 
time of my youth]
¿Sintió que no había aprovechado del todo su 
juventud? [Did she feel that she hadn’t made 
the most of her youth?] 
7. Se creaba tiempo para sus momentos privados 
[He made time for her private moments]
¿Generaba tiempo para compartir con otros? [Did 
she make time for social gatherings?]
8. No te regala un minuto de su tiempo [He won’t 
give you a minute of his time]
¿Administra cuidadosamente su tiempo? SI [Does 
he administer his time carefully?] 
9. Escapó de aquel día con un cansancio descomu-
nal [I escaped from that day with a tremendous 
tiredness]
¿Terminó el día relajado? [Was he revitalized at 
the end of the day?]
10. Puso sus horas a disposición de su jefe [She 
placed her time hours at her boss’s disposal]
¿Mostró predisposición para el trabajo? [Did she 
show predisposition for work?] 
11. Era díficil robarle un minuto a aquel profe-
sor [It was hard to borrow a minute from that 
professor]
¿Estaba el profesor ampliamente disponible? 
[Was the professor fully available?] 
12. En aquel pueblo no había cómo matar el tiem-
po [In that town there were no ways of killing 
time]
¿Se trataba de un pueblo aburrido? [Was the 
town boring?] 
13. Exprimíamos los días como si fueran los últimos 
[We seized the days as if they were the last]. 
¿Queríamos que transcurrieran rápido los días? 
[Did we want those days to elapse quickly?]
14. Malgastaba el tiempo en discusiones inútiles [He 
misspent time in pointless discussions]
¿Hacía un uso tonto de su tiempo? [Did she make 
a silly use of her time?] 
15. Entregó sus últimas horas a Dios [He offered 
his last hours to God]
¿Se dedicó al placer en el tramo final de su vida? 
[Did he devote his last hours to leisure?]
16. Acumulaba días para sus vacaciones [He was 
accruing days for his vacations] 
¿Buscaba tener unas vacaciones largas? [Was he 
planning to have long holydays?] 
17. Se nos esfumaba el tiempo y no lográbamos 
dominar los contenidos [Time vanished and we 
were not mastering the learning materials]
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18. Había que meter todas las activiades en una 
semana [All activities had to be packed within 
one week].
¿Estábamos faltos de tiempo? [Were we short 
of time?] 
19. Se propuso ganarle la carrera al tiempo y ter-
minar la tarea [He set the objective of defeating 
time and finishing his task]
¿Postergaría la tarea? [Would he postpone the 
completion of the task?]
20. Dilapidaba sus días en nada [She was dilapi-
dating her days for nothing]
¿Hacía mal uso del tiempo? [Was she emplying 
her time inadequately?] 
21.  Ella le ganaría la batalla al tiempo [She was 
decided to win the battle against time] 
¿Había desistido de intentarlo? [Had she with-
drawn from her intentions?]
22. Ganaba tiempo con su nuevo método [He saved 
time with his new method]
¿Su método le resultaba útil? [Was the new 
method useful?] 
23. El tiempo se estiraba a la espera de que ella lle-
gara [Time stretched while waiting her to arrive] 
¿Llegó ella antes que él? [Did she arrive earlier 
than him?]
24. El tiempo había dejado sus huellas en nosotros 
[Time had left traces on us]
¿Se advertían los años trancurridos? [Had we 
changed noticeably over the years?] 
25. Buscaba resucitar los tiempos pasados [He wanted 
to revive past times] 
¿Quería olvidar el pasado? [Was he willing to 
forget the past?]
26. Pudimos encajar todo lo programado en un día 
[We managed to fit all the programmed activities 
within one single day]
¿Fue finalmente suficiente el tiempo? [Was time 
finally sufficient?]
27. No podíamos derrochar más nuestras tardes 
[We could not waste our afternoons any longer]
¿Podíamos seguir relajados? [Could we keep 
being so relaxed?]
28. Supo invertir bien años más productivos [He 
managed to capitalize on his most productive 
years]
¿Sacó provecho de sus años mas productivos? 
[Did he take advantage of his most productive 
tears?]
Received: november 17th, 2017  
Approved: july 8th, 2019
